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ARTICLE
Lobbying in the EU Comitology
System
RIKKE WETENDORFF NØRGAARD*, PETER
NEDERGAARD** & JENS BLOM-HANSEN***
*Ministry of Business and Growth, Copenhagen, Denmark;
**Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark;
***Department of Political Science and Government, University of Aarhus, Aarhus,
Denmark
ABSTRACT Comitology is an important part of the EU’s regulatory framework.
Hence, lobbying by outside interests is to be expected. However, lobbying in the com-
itology system has received almost no scholarly attention. This paper provides the first
understanding of the subject by analysing the access of business interests to actors in
the comitology system. The analysis is designed as a most likely study of two cases,
aviation safety and CO2 quotas. Based on Bouwen’s rationalist theory of access
goods, the empirical analysis shows that lobbying is prevalent, especially by sectoral
interests providing expert knowledge and targeted mainly at the Commission, but also
at the member states in the comitology committees, and the European Parliament.
The case studies therefore indicate that lobbying is widespread in the comitology sys-
tem and important to study in order to understand the outputs from this part of the
EU political system.
KEY WORDS: comitology, lobbyism, EU, rationality, Bouwen’s ‘access’ theory
1. Introduction
Over the years, the EU’s regulatory activity has grown so much that the
Council of Ministers and the European Parliament increasingly delegate
rule-making powers to the Commission. Today, the Commission is there-
fore an important rule-maker. In fact, most EU rules are now Commission
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rules. However, the Commission is no autonomous rule-maker. In most
areas where it has been delegated powers to issue rules, oversight commit-
tees composed of representatives from member states (so-called comitology
committees) monitor them.
The world of comitology committees remains one of the least illuminated
aspects of the EU political system. Only in the last 10–15 years has schol-
arly interest developed, and today the history of the comitology system, its
institutional set-up, its incidence and daily operation is no longer a white
spot on the EU map (Bergstro¨m 2005; Blom-Hansen 2011; Brandsma
2010; Christiansen, Oettel, and Vaccari 2009). But one aspect remains
understudied: lobbying by outside interests. From the general literature on
lobbyism in the EU, we know that interest groups are about as active at
the European level as they are within the member states (Coen 2007;
Greenwood 2007; Kohler-Koch 1997; Mazey and Richardson 2006;
Nedergaard 2009). However, their involvement and influence in the
comitology system remain largely unstudied.
Observers of the comitology system have noted that interest groups pay
considerable attention to it. For example, the Commission’s own 2002
study of the system noted ‘that third parties, interest groups, industry and
NGOs are always trying to influence the work of committees, both with
the Commission and in the Member States with the Member State govern-
ments. This is normal procedure …’ (Commission 2002, 219; Egan and
Wolf 1999, 252–3; see also Schaefer and Tu¨rk 2007).
In addition, case studies of selected individual comitology committees,
although undertaken for different purposes, often note that interest groups
may be involved in the committees’ work: for example, the advisory
committee on safety, hygiene and health protection (Daemen and van
Schendelen 1998), the standing committee on foodstuffs (Neyer 1998), the
eco-label regulatory committee (Philip 1998), GMO-authorisations (Gatt
2009) and the committee on the wild birds’ directive (Alfe´, Brandsma and
Christiansen 2009).
However, this amounts to scattered evidence. To the best of our knowl-
edge, there is no systematic study of lobbying in the comitology system. In
the general literature on comitology, the phenomenon is hardly even
mentioned (Bergstro¨m 2005; Blom-Hansen 2011; Brandsma 2010).
The purpose of this paper is to provide a first understanding of lobbying
by outside interests in the comitology system. We seek to uncover which
interests are active and why, which EU institutions are targets of lobbying
in the comitology process, and when and why interest groups gain access.
Given the limited scholarly attention paid to lobbying in the comitology
process, we have designed our analysis as a most likely case study. The aim
is to investigate whether lobbying in the comitology system merits more
systematic study in the future by giving a first analysis of the characteristics
of lobbying in this particular part of the EU system. Our study should thus
be read as a plausibility probe (George and Bennett 2005, 75). Specifically,
we have selected two cases — CO2 quotas and air traffic safety — which
are technically complex, carry potentially important effects for private
interests, and where the Commission is formally required to consult
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stakeholders. Furthermore, the cases have been selected because they
provide outside interests with the maximum number of access points. Deci-
sions on both cases are made under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny,
which is the comitology procedure with the broadest involvement of EU
institutions. Although this procedure was phased out after the comitology
reform in 2011, it provides the most favourable opportunity for studying
the extent to which lobbying in the comitology system is directed at the
European Parliament. Finally, we not only study lobbyism at the EU level,
but also at the member state level, which may provide outside interests
with easier access to the member state representatives in the comitology
committees. In the conclusion, we discuss in more detail what can be learnt
from this most likely scenario.
Our study is limited in two senses. We only study business interests as rep-
resented by Business Interest Associations (BIA), and at the national level
we only focus on one member state, Denmark. These limitations are due to
practical reasons and are obvious points for further research to remedy.
The remaining part of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 intro-
duces the comitology system. Section 3 presents the paper’s theoretical
framework, which is based on Bouwen’s (2004) model of access to deci-
sion-making procedures. In Section 4 we discuss the selection of our two
cases and other methodological issues. The empirical analysis, which finds
lobbying to be pervasive, follows in Section 5. Finally, in the conclusion we
discuss the wider lessons of our most likely case studies, inter alia in the
light of the post-Lisbon comitology reform in 2011.
2. The Comitology System
The concept of ‘comitology’ refers to the process by which the Commission
adopts implementing measures based on the authority delegated by the
Council and the European Parliament. This is often done under the control
of a comitology committee composed of experts representing the EU mem-
ber states, normally officials from government ministries or agencies. The
comitology committees are chaired by the Commission, which sets the
agenda and distributes the meeting material, takes minutes, but does not
have any voting rights (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen 2010; Commission
2002, 169).
Control of the Commission by comitology committees has a long history.
It was introduced in the early 1960s, when the Common Agricultural Policy
was implemented. However, it was not given any explicit Treaty foundation
until the Single European Act in 1987. The Council then adopted its first
comitology decision, which codified the various comitology procedures into
four generic types (but with several variants): advisory, management, regu-
latory and safeguard. In 1999, the Council adopted its second comitology
decision, which abolished the variants, but maintained the four generic types
(Bergstro¨m 2005, 189–201; 249–78). In 2006, the second comitology
decision was amended, and the regulatory procedure with scrutiny was
added to the list. This gave the Council and the European Parliament veto
rights, even after a positive committee opinion (Blom-Hansen 2011, 72–94).
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In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty introduced a distinction between delegated and
implementing acts. While implementing acts are controlled by comitology
procedures, delegated acts are controlled directly by the Council and the
European Parliament (Christiansen and Dobbels 2013). Direct control will
gradually replace the regulatory procedure with scrutiny in a process expected
to be completed by 2014 (Hardacre and Kaeding 2011). In 2011, a new comi-
tology regulation was adopted that changes the management and regulatory
procedures into a new examination procedure (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen
2012; European Parliament and Council 2011).
In total, there are 250–300 comitology committees spanning all areas
regulated by the EU (Commission 2010a). Accounts given before the
Lisbon Treaty show that approximately two thirds of all Commission regu-
lations, directives and decisions are adopted under comitology procedures
(Brandsma 2010, 33). The post-Lisbon system both reduces and expands
comitology control of the Commission. Direct Council and Parliament con-
trol of the new delegated acts reduces comitology and abolishes the regula-
tory procedure with scrutiny. But the 2011 reform expands comitology to
include the common commercial policy (Brandsma and Blom-Hansen
2012). In sum, comitology continues to be a standard control mechanism
in EU delegated decision-making.
While the composition of comitology committees does not differ across
committees, the various comitology procedures specify the decision rule in
the committees and the degree of involvement of the member states and the
European Parliament.1 In particular, the position of the European Parlia-
ment varies considerably across procedures. In order to study the widest
possible targeting of lobbying efforts, we focus on the comitology proce-
dure, which provides the broadest involvement of the European Parliament.
This is the regulatory procedure with scrutiny.
This procedure consists of two phases (Council of Ministers 2006, article
5a). In the first phase the Commission submits its draft measure to the rele-
vant committee, which states its opinion by qualified majority. Prior to the
vote, stakeholders are often consulted through open stakeholder meetings.2
In contrast to the other procedures, the draft measure is then in a second
phase submitted to the Council and the European Parliament, irrespective
of the committee’s opinion. If the committee’s opinion is positive, both the
European Parliament and the Council can object to the draft, in which case
the Commission must abandon it. If the committee gives a negative opinion
or no opinion, the draft is submitted to the Council for decision and simul-
taneously sent to the Parliament for information. If the Council objects to
the draft within two months, the Commission must abandon it. If the
Council does not object, the Parliament then has four months to oppose
the draft, in which case the Commission must abandon it.
In contrast to the other comitology procedures, the regulatory procedure
with scrutiny thus provides the European Parliament with considerable
influence. We expect this fact to make the Parliament an attractive target
for lobbying in addition to the Commission and the comitology
committees. Focusing on this specific procedure thus enables us to study
the extent to which outside interests use all channels of influence.
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3. Theoretical Expectations
In the vast literature on lobbyism in the EU, one of the fundamental issues
remains how to study the influence of interest groups on policy outcomes
(Du¨r 2008; Du¨r and De Bie`vre 2007; Richardson 2007). One strand of
studies has argued for the need to focus on the exchange of information for
access to decision-makers (Bouwen 2004). Thus, from this perspective, lob-
bying is all about providing the right information to decision-makers
(Chalmers 2011). Despite the obvious weaknesses of associating access
with influence, it remains a fruitful path for studying lobbying, especially
when it comes to the comitology system where decisions concern very com-
plex parts of EU regulations. Therefore, this paper builds on Bouwen’s
(2004) access model, which is developed to explain lobbying by BIAs in the
comitology system.
Bouwen (2004) argues that business lobbying may succeed because busi-
ness organisations can provide the EU institutions with resources, so-called
access goods. Three types of access goods are identified: expert knowledge,
information about encompassing European interests and information about
encompassing domestic interests (Bouwen 2004, 343). These goods, how-
ever, are not demanded by the various EU institutions to the same extent.
Studying EU legislative politics, Bouwen argues that expert knowledge is
primarily demanded by the Commission, information about European
interests by the European Parliament and information about domestic
interests by the Council. Since different types of business organisations can
provide the access goods to various extents, Bouwen assumes that they are
granted access to the various EU institutions to different degrees. For exam-
ple, euro groups are expected to have access to the European Parliament,
while domestic business groups are expected to have easy access to the
member states in the Council.
To understand business lobbying in the comitology system, we adapt
Bouwen’s model in two respects. First, we introduce a distinction between
general and sectoral business interests. As mentioned, Bouwen’s model
focuses on the legislative procedure where general and sectoral business
interests can be expected to be equally influential (of course depending on
the nature of proposed legislation). Bouwen therefore has little reason to
distinguish between sectoral and general business interests. However, when
studying lobbying in the comitology system with its high level of complex-
ity and specificity, it can be useful to distinguish between sectoral and gen-
eral business interests, because sectoral business interests can be expected
to possess more of the specific expert knowledge needed in the comitology
system.
Second, we need to re-think the demand side of Bouwen’s model. The
demand side in legislative decision-making is different from executive deci-
sion-making in the comitology system because the positions of the EU insti-
tutions differ. More specifically, we expect the Commission to demand
expert knowledge since it is responsible for drafting implementation mea-
sures within the technical areas regulated in the comitology system. In
addition, the Commission is, as guardian of the Treaty and the European
common interest, expected to demand information about the encompassing
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European interest. But again, due to the technical nature of comitology
matters, we expect the Commission to first and foremost demand informa-
tion of a sectoral nature.
Turning to the member states in the comitology committees, their repre-
sentatives are typically experts from the national ministerial systems.
Hence, we do not expect them to demand expert knowledge to the same
extent as the Commission. Representing individual member states, they are
more likely to demand information about domestic interests. Again, due to
the technical nature of comitology matters, we expect their demand to have
a sectoral, rather than general, focus.
Finally, we expect the European Parliament to demand expert knowledge
in order to enable it to evaluate whether or not to oppose the Commis-
sion’s measures. At the same time, and following Bouwen (2004), we
expect the European Parliament to demand information about European
interests, but again with a sectoral, rather than general, focus.
In sum, we end up hypothesising that business interests are granted
access to all EU actors in the comitology system, but to varying degrees.
Our hypotheses are summarised in Table 1.
4. Research Design
As mentioned in the introduction, very little attention has been paid to the
study of lobbying in the comitology system. In order to gain a first insight
into this, we have therefore based our selection of cases on a most likely
design.
Our comparative analysis consists of two cases of rules adopted by the
Commission under the regulatory procedure with scrutiny. In the first, here-
after referred to as the case of CO2 quotas, the Commission adopted a deci-
sion in 2011 on transitional union-wide rules for harmonised free allocation
of emission allowances (Commission 2010b, 2011). This followed a 2008
decision by the EU’s Heads of State and Government that, as part of the
climate and energy package, the annual quantity of allowances in the EU’s
CO2 quota system should be set at the EU level from 2013. A portion of the
allowances were to be allocated free of charge to companies in relation to
so-called benchmarks; for example, the number of allowances per produced
amount of paper, steel, etc. These benchmarks are calculated in the
comitology system in relation to the CO2 emissions from the average of the
10 per cent most efficient producers in Europe (European Parliament and
Table 1. Overview of hypotheses
Access to Commission SEBI > GEBI > SNBI/GNBI
Access to European Parliament SEBI > GEBI > SNBI/GNBI
Access to member states in the comitology committees SNBI > GNBI > SEBI/GEBI
Note: SEBI = sectoral European business interests; GEBI = general European business
interests; SNBI = sectoral national business interests; GNBI = general national business
interests.
A slash indicates that the rank order of access is theoretically indeterminate.
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Council 2003, art. 10a). The comitology committee responsible for
monitoring the Commission in the case of CO2 quotas was the Climate
Change Committee chaired by DG Environment3 (Commission 2010b). The
committee met approximately every second month between 2009 and 2011
to prepare and ultimately adopt the implementing decision (Informant K).
In the second case, hereafter referred to as the case of aviation safety, the
Commission adopted a regulation on civil aviation security in 2009 (Com-
mission 2009a, 2009b). This regulation includes the permission to screen
persons and goods at airports. Not least the Commission’s first proposal
attracted much attention because it introduced body scanners as a method
for screening individuals. The comitology committee responsible for moni-
toring the Commission in this case was the Committee for Civil Aviation
Safety chaired by DG Transport4 (Commission 2009b). The committee met
approximately 10 times in 2008–2009 to prepare and ultimately adopt the
implementing regulation (Informant H).
The data to analyse the two cases stems from interviews and documents,
partly from the Commission’s comitology register. Informants of business
interests represent both general European and national general and sectoral
organisations. Additional informants were selected representing the possi-
ble targets for the BIAs’ lobbying activities: the Commission, the European
Parliament and the comitology committees. A total of 11 informants were
identified (please see Appendix for details), partly through examination of
attendance lists and summaries of Commission stakeholder meetings, and
partly through the snowball method, where informants were asked to iden-
tify other informants. All interviews were carried out in 2011.
Before conducting the analysis, it is necessary to translate our theoretical
concepts into measurable variables. It is crucial to understand how access
can be tested by the means of a qualitative inquiry. Bouwen (2004) con-
ducted a large number of interviews with public officials in the Council,
the Commission and the European Parliament to develop his theory of
access goods. To obtain information about the relative access of lobbying
actors, the officials were asked about their contacts with private interests.
In this study, we have followed the same idea by conducting a number
of interviews with public officials asking them about their contacts with
BIAs. Since the relatively small number of interviews (11) does not allow
for statistical testing of the access, written sources such as the attendance
lists of Commission stakeholder meetings have been added as an indicator
of access. This empirical foundation evidently only allows for a limited
investigation, which is why the analysis should be seen as a plausibility
probe. The idea is to make a first attempt to point out the characteristics of
lobbying in the comitology system.
5. Empirical Analysis
In this section, we investigate the hypotheses in three steps. First, we map
the active BIAs in the two cases. Second, we investigate which EU institu-
tions were targeted by their lobbying efforts. Third, we evaluate which
BIAs were granted access to the comitology system.
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5.1. Active Business Interests
In accordance with our expectations, the European sectoral organisations
seem to have been more active than the European general organisations in
both the case of CO2 quotas and aviation safety. This is because the imple-
menting measures adopted in both cases, and the associated costs, were tar-
geted at a narrow range of business stakeholders, rather than at business
interests in general.
In the case of CO2 quotas, it is clear from the attendance lists from the
Commission’s stakeholder meetings that the European sectoral organisa-
tions were strongly represented (Commission 2009c, 2009d). CO2 quotas
carry significant costs, especially for energy-intensive industries, and
because the basic act provides the same allocation to all producers of the
same types of products throughout the EU (Ministry of Climate and Energy
2010, 1), a basis was created on which producers could meet in their
respective sectoral organisations to maximise the number of free quotas for
their particular products (Informant K).
One of the BIAs that was active in the case of CO2 quotas was Euromet-
aux, a European sectoral organisation representing the interests of the main
EU and international metals producers and commodity groups, as well as
national metal federations. For this organisation, the risk was that the
metal industry would be excluded from the group of producers provided
with free CO2 quotas. Consequently, it was strongly motivated to
lobby. The new rules might therefore force small producers to close down
and sharply curtail the production of others. Hence, there were vital inter-
ests at stake (Informant C).
In the case of aviation safety, two kinds of sectoral organisations were
particularly active in dealing with the Commission’s proposal: European
airports (ACI Europe) and European airlines (Association of European
Airlines — AEA). The risk that the airports would have to shoulder the
costs of installing body scanners triggered ACI Europe to undertake lobby-
ing activities. Smaller airports in particular would have difficulties in fund-
ing body scanners. At the same time, ACI Europe wanted major airports
with the capacity to carry the financial costs to be able to voluntarily
choose body scanners because this would allow them to meet pressure from
the US government to intensify security screening of passengers travelling
to the US (Informant G). The Commission’s proposal also carried financial
risks to the airline companies because the airports might collect taxes from
the airline companies to fund the body scanners. In addition, the proposed
body scanners jeopardised the airlines’ recent mobility agenda. It was
against this backdrop that the AEA also chose to launch lobbying activities
(Informant J).
The national sectoral organisations were also active in the two cases. In
the case of aviation safety, they initiated lobbying activities at the request
of their European counterparts. ACI Europe thus made its members aware
of the need to lobby and equipped them with information to contact the
relevant national authorities. The division of labour between the European
and national sectoral organisations in the case of aviation safety also
reflects what in the literature is considered to be the very essence behind
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the membership of national sectoral organisations in European organisa-
tions. As pointed out by Greenwood (2007, 52), the majority of national
economic and sectoral organisations justify such membership with access
to information and ‘advocacy’, i.e. safeguarding their interests at European
level in cases where they do not have the capacity to be active themselves.
In the case of CO2 quotas, the most active BIA at the national level in
Denmark was the Confederation of Danish Industries. Somewhat surpris-
ingly to us, this general business organisation lobbied on behalf of a single
member, although this was part of a larger effort in which the member of
both the national and the European sectoral organisation cooperated with
the Confederation of Danish Industries to ensure that the benchmark for
the member’s product type was set ‘correctly’ on the basis of future CO2
quotas. The Confederation claimed that it was not able to assist all mem-
bers in the same way as it helped this particular one, but that the lobbying
effort was launched after a direct request from the member. The Confeder-
ation only assisted in this particular case because its efforts would not be at
the expense of other members (Informant I and D).
The fact that a national general organisation such as the Confederation
of Danish Industries engages in lobbying activities goes against our theoret-
ical expectations. The same can be said for the European general organisa-
tion BUSINESSEUROPE’s lobbying efforts in the case of CO2 quotas. This
organisation is a broad and general European business group consisting of
41 national member organisations from 35 European countries, with mem-
bers ranging from the energy sector to the chemical and financial sectors.
Far from all members of BUSINESSEUROPE were concerned by the CO2
quotas, and those who were represented different sectors for which bench-
marks for CO2 quotas could and should be set differently. Accordingly, it
was an exercise in itself to ensure that no sectors were given first priority
and special treatment. When BUSINESSEUROPE nevertheless chose to
lobby in the CO2 quotas case, it did so on a cross-sectoral basis that
involved the majority of its members. No priority was thus given to indi-
vidual sectors and the individual gain for its members was estimated to be
greater than the cost of engaging in lobbying activity in this particular field
(Informant D).
5.2. Targets for the Lobbying Activities of Business Interests
The BIAs’ choice of lobbying targets appears to be based on a rational
assessment of which EU actors can best defend their interests. In the case
of CO2 quotas, the European sectoral organisation, Eurometaux, first and
foremost directed its lobbying at the Commission, as the Commission was
responsible for drafting the proposal for an implementing measure, and
hence needed to gather technical data that would ultimately determine
whether or not Eurometaux’ members would receive free CO2 quotas.
Eurometaux expected that if it supplied the Commission with technical
data, the Commission would be receptive to its messages and ensure that
the process for the allocation of benchmarks with regard to CO2 quotas
was carried out in a way that its members would be charged with the
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lowest possible cost (Informant C). The choice of one EU institution as a
main target did, however, not preclude a parallel effort vis-a`-vis another
institution. Eurometaux also mobilised its national members and asked
them to lobby their national representatives in the comitology committee,
the Climate Change Committee. Eurometaux judged that the committee,
due to its intergovernmental nature, would be receptive to the information
which its national affiliates had to offer. Also, the European general organi-
sation BUSINESSEUROPE encouraged its national member organisations
in the case of CO2 quotas to contact their respective countries’ representa-
tives in the comitology committee, in addition to its lobbying efforts
towards the Commission (Informant G).
In the case of aviation safety, the same reasoning was true for ACI
Europe. The organisation worked to ensure that body scanners were made
voluntary and not mandatory by focusing its lobbying efforts on both the
Commission and the Committee on Civil Aviation Security. ACI Europe
lobbied the Commission early on in the comitology procedure when the
implementing measure was being drafted (by the Commission) and the
impact assessment was being carried out to ensure that the implementing
measure allowed for the use of body scanners. As soon as the Commis-
sion’s draft implementing measure reached the Committee on Civil Avia-
tion Security, ACI Europe asked its members to lobby the national
members of the committee. ACI Europe thus targeted its lobbying efforts
at the Commission and the comitology committee at the point in the comi-
tology procedure where their respective powers were thought to be the
greatest in order to maximise the potential for influence.
We also expected the European Parliament to be a desired target for the
lobbying activity of BIA. However, in the case of CO2 quotas neither BUSI-
NESSEUROPE nor Eurometaux actively lobbied the Parliament. Both or-
ganisations explained that they could not use it to change the Commission’s
draft because the Parliament’s power to object to an implementing measure
is a veto right rather than a right to make amendments. And they could not
hope to persuade the Parliament to use their right of objection because it
traditionally favours strict climate regulation, and an objection would mean
the withdrawal of the Commission’s draft and thus a return to the status
quo with more lax regulation (Informant C and D). Therefore, the
organisations concentrated their lobbying activities elsewhere.
However, in the case of aviation safety, ACI Europe chose the European
Parliament as a third target of lobbying in addition to the Commission and
the comitology committee (Informant F). This may partly be explained by
the fact that the Parliament’s TRAN committee (responsible for the issue
of aviation safety) may be more receptive to the lobbying efforts of BIAs
than the ENVI committee (responsible for the case of CO2 quotas). The
TRAN committee has, in contrast to the ENVI committee, appointed two
special comitology rapporteurs in charge of handling all comitology cases.
However, ACI Europe nevertheless directed its lobbying efforts against a
broad group of members of the TRAN Committee. This was part of a
general strategy, following the Parliament’s increasing powers under the
ordinary legislative procedure (Informant G).
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5.3. Access to the Comitology Procedure
In both the case of CO2 quotas and aviation safety, the basic acts require
that the Commission consults relevant stakeholders, notably through open
stakeholder meetings prior to the adoption of implementing measures (see
e.g. Commission 2009c, 2009d). In addition to these general stakeholder
meetings, more privileged bilateral contacts were made between BIAs on
the one hand and the Commission, the comitology committees and the Par-
liament, on the other. As mentioned, the Commission demands mainly
technical information on individual sectors, which is what in Bouwen’s
terminology is called ‘expert knowledge’ (Bouwen 2004, 340) and
‘information about the European encompassing (sectoral) interest’.
In the case of CO2 quotas, Eurometaux was able to match the Commis-
sion’s demand for information and thus gained access to it in the form of
both the open stakeholder meetings and a series of bilateral meetings.
Eurometaux could provide the figures and technical data from its member
associations necessary to calculate the benchmarks for the metal sector and
its subsectors. At the same time, Eurometaux was able, as a federation of
national sectoral organisations, to provide information on how to imple-
ment the measure and how it would be received by the metal industry as a
whole at the European level, i.e. ‘information about the European encom-
passing (sectoral) interest’ (Informant C). BUSINESSEUROPE was, as a
European general organisation composed of national business associations,
not able to provide detailed technical information or information about
specific sectoral interests. Nonetheless, it had access to the comitology pro-
cedure in the form of one bilateral meeting with the Commission. How-
ever, meetings between the Commission and general business interests are
only rarely about just one subject. The meeting in question between DG
Climate and BUSINESSEUROPE thus included a range of matters in addi-
tion to the CO2 quotas (Informant D). In other words, access was probably
derived from other cases, in which there may have been a better match
between BUSINESSEUROPE’s provision of access goods and the
Commission’s demand (Informant B).
The case of aviation safety showed exactly the same activities, structures
and results. Here the European sectoral organisations, ACI Europe and
AEA, were also able to provide the Commission with information, inter
alia on the implications of body scanners in European airports and airlines.
ACI Europe and AEA were able to provide the demanded information from
their national members and frame it to a common European position
(Informant B).
The comitology committees are composed of specialists in their own
right, which is why the Climate Change Committee and the Committee on
Civil Aviation Security are not expected to demand expert knowledge, but
rather information about domestic sectoral interests. In the case of
Denmark, national sectoral organisations such as the Lime and Brick
Association and Danish Energy were able to provide the requested access
goods and were thus given access to the comitology procedure in the form
of bilateral meetings with the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy,
which represented Denmark in the Climate Change Committee.
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The national general organisation, the Confederation of Danish Indus-
tries, however, also gained access to the Ministry of Climate and Energy,
despite our expectation that it would not be able to provide the demanded
access goods, but rather ‘information about domestic encompassing (gen-
eral) interest’. It obtained access partly through a network, which the Min-
istry and the Confederation created jointly under the name ‘Quota
Network’ and which still exists today. Through the network, members of
the Confederation who had a special interest in climate matters would
receive a status on current climate negotiations and would be able to ask
questions and comment on the Ministry of Climate and Energy’s policies,
thereby giving the network members an insight into the current negotiation
situation as well as give the Ministry an insight into industry concerns. In
particular, the EU Emission Trading System and the related benchmark
exercise were debated by the network, but the international climate devel-
opments within the realm of the UN were also in focus. In addition, the
Ministry held a series of bilateral meetings with the Confederation concern-
ing primarily one particular case which the Confederation raised on behalf
of a member operating in a particularly vulnerable sector (Informant K).
The access of the Confederation of Danish Industries to the comitology
procedure through the Danish Ministry of Climate and Energy can be seen
in the light of two factors: firstly, the Confederation is the largest general
business organisation in Denmark and a significant player on the Danish
scene. It was therefore in constant contact with the Ministry of Climate
and Energy regarding other cases, which may have created the basis for
access in the case of CO2 quotas (Informant K). Another factor which may
have eased access comprises the efforts made by the Confederation on the
aforementioned single issue, where the Confederation could offer informa-
tion about how the Commission’s proposal would affect a single sector,
which is a subset of what Bouwen denotes ‘information about the encom-
passing (sectoral) national interest’. This allowed the Confederation to
offer the access goods which both the Danish Ministry and the Committee
on Climate Change demanded.
In the case of aviation safety, the Danish Civil Aviation Administration
was the Danish national representative in the Committee on Civil Aviation
Security. The Civil Aviation Administration was in contact with the sec-
toral organisation, Danish Airports Association (DANSAM), and a few air-
ports that are not members of this organisation, because they could
provide information on technical details on individual Danish airports
(Informant H). The Civil Aviation Administration did not, however, con-
tact for example the Confederation of Danish Industries, which acts as a
sectoral organisation for various parts of the transport industry such as air
transport, freight and public transport. This is because ‘information about
the encompassing (general) national interest’, such as information that the
business organisations did not want regulation or that regulation would
increase its members’ costs, is difficult to translate into detailed
negotiations on the proposal in a comitology committee, and is therefore
of little value for the members of a comitology committee. This organisa-
tion thus had too broad a scope to be able to provide the demanded access
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goods, and therefore did not obtain access to the comitology procedure
(Informant H).
In contrast to the case of CO2 quotas, there were contacts between BIAs
and the European Parliament in the case of aviation safety. The Parliament
(particularly the TRAN Committee) sought information on the implica-
tions of body scanners in airports and airlines, respectively, in order to
assess whether there were grounds for objecting to the Commission’s draft
implementing measure (Informant A). Again, the European sectoral organi-
sations such as ACI Europe and AEA were able to provide the requested
access goods. This paved the way for access.
In sum, our findings show that a number of sectoral and general business
interests were actively trying to obtain access to the comitology system in
both our cases. Furthermore, BIAs appear to be active at both the Euro-
pean and the national arenas. As expected by our hypotheses based on
Bouwen’s (2004) access model, both sectoral and general business interests
sought access through multiple channels, including the Commission, the
national representatives in the comitology committees and the European
Parliament. However, in the case of CO2 quotas, their interest in the Euro-
pean Parliament was smaller than we expected due to the nature of the Par-
liament’s power in the comitology procedure. BIAs were generally
successful in obtaining access, though to varying degrees. As expected by
our hypotheses, the institutions in the comitology system were mostly inter-
ested in contacts with sectoral interests since they could offer the access
goods in demand, in particular expert knowledge. General interests were
not, however, completely shut out, but contacts were less intense.
6. Conclusion and Lessons of the Case Studies for the Post-Lisbon
Comitology System
Our study of two comitology cases — CO2 quotas and aviation safety —
found clear traces of lobbying by BIAs. Lobbying efforts were targeted at
the Commission, the member states in the comitology committees and the
European Parliament. The efforts were successful in the sense that the BIAs
were granted access.
Before drawing final conclusions from these findings, the most likely
nature of our cases should be borne in mind. We deliberately selected cases
that had important effects for outside interests, and we focused on the only
comitology procedure that grants the European Parliament considerable
influence. Our empirical setting thus made it likely that lobbying would
take place and would be directed towards a range of EU actors. In light of
the limited evidence on the subject, we believe this research design is justi-
fied. Our intention was to conduct a plausibility probe and investigate
whether lobbying in the comitology system merits more systematic study in
the future. We think that our plausibility probe paid off. Lobbying turned
out to be prevalent and the phenomenon therefore deserves closer attention
from social scientists in the future.
Furthermore, the analysis has pointed to characteristics that distinguish
lobbying in the comitology system from normal lobbying activities in EU
executive decision-making. First, the comitology procedures provide more
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access points for outside interests. They can not only target the Commis-
sion, but also the member states and the European Parliament. Second,
compared to lobbying in the context of executive decision-making, lobby-
ing in the comitology system appears to be dominated by sectoral organisa-
tions. This is due to the technical issues handled by the committees and the
derived need for expert knowledge.
However, the question remains as to whether our cases are too likely, or
too extreme, to be of general interest. First, is it extreme or unusual that
comitology cases have important effects for BIAs? We do not think so.
Comitology procedures are used in all EU policy areas, but are especially
frequent within the environmental areas, the internal market and agricul-
ture (Commission 2010a, Table 1). These are all areas where EU regulation
is important to business interests.
Second, is the comitology procedure which we studied — the regulatory
procedure with scrutiny — still relevant after the Lisbon Treaty, which
entails the gradual phasing out of this specific procedure (cf. Hardacre and
Kaeding 2011)? Since the post-Lisbon comitology system only comprises
the advisory procedure and revised versions of the management and regula-
tory procedures (cf. Brandsma and Blom-Hansen 2012), the European Par-
liament now appears to play a more limited role in regards to the adoption
of implementing acts. The introduction of delegated acts, however, foresees
a considerable scrutiny role for the European Parliament, while comitology
committees are the ones which lack formal scrutiny power.
Nonetheless, we believe that there are two reasons why our cases remain
interesting in the post-Lisbon period. First, when preparing delegated acts,
the Commission has agreed to consult expert groups of member state
representatives. The exact status of this requirement will only become evi-
dent from practical use. Speculation by informed observers, however, is
that this may amount to an informal comitology system (Peers and Costa
2012, 453). This suggests that comitology committees will continue to be
interesting targets for lobbying in both the case of implementing and
delegated acts. Moreover, the European Parliament has been granted access
to the aforementioned expert groups. This was obtained as part of the
inter-institutional negotiations on the 2011 comitology reform (Brandsma
and Blom-Hansen 2012). This fact, combined with the European
Parliament’s considerable scrutiny role in relation to delegated acts, is
likely to make the Parliament an attractive lobbying target.
Second, the new comitology system in relation to implementing acts does
not grant the European Parliament more influence than it enjoyed under
the old advisory, management and regulatory procedures, i.e. the pre-2006
comitology system. The European Parliament therefore does not appear to
be an especially attractive lobbying target for BIAs in the case of imple-
menting acts. However, the new comitology regulation includes a review
clause stipulating an evaluation in 2016 (European Parliament and Council
2011, Article 15). If history provides any guide, all EU institutions will use
this as an occasion to fight for more control positions in the comitology
system. The European Parliament in particular is likely to fight for a more
privileged position and, again judging from previous reforms, it is likely to
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succeed. The history of comitology reforms is to a large extent the history
of gradually increasing influence for the European Parliament (Bergstro¨m
2005, 313–5; Blom-Hansen 2011, 17–21). In short, it is by no means cer-
tain that the European Parliament continues to be an unattractive target
for lobbying in the post-Lisbon comitology system.
In sum, lobbyism in the comitology system seems to be a political phe-
nomenon deserving more scholarly interest. Our study was limited to BIAs.
It did not include consumer or environmental interests. Furthermore, at the
national level it was limited to one member state, Denmark. Finally, we
studied access, rather than influence, by outside interests. Access may be a
prerequisite for influence, but does not equate to it. In the final analysis,
the interesting question concerns influence and the extent to which outside
interests succeed in introducing bias into the comitology system. These
points are obvious ones for future research to address.
Notes
1. See Blom-Hansen (2011, 24–5) for a detailed explanation of the various procedures and their
development over time.
2. See Section 5 for more information on stakeholder meetings in the specific cases of CO2 quotas
and aviation safety.
3. At the beginning of the term of the Barroso II Commission the file was transferred to DG Climate.
4. As of 2010 named DG Move.
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Interviewee Organisation Position
Interview
date
A European Parliament, Environmental
Committee
Policy Officer 18.04.2011
B DG Climate Policy; Unit B2,
Benchmarking
Head of Unit 18.04.2011
C Eurometaux Director, Energy and
Climate Change
Policy
19.04.2011
D BUSINESSEUROPE Director, Industrial
Affairs
19.04.2011
E Confederation of Danish Industries
(Energy and Climate Policy
Department)
Policy Officer 09.05.2011
F European Parliament, Transportation
Committee
Policy Officer 02.05.2011
G ACI Europe Senior Manager,
Aviation Security
05.05.2011
H Ministry of Transportation of
Denmark (Department for EU
Coordination, Air Transportation and
Security)
Head of Division 27.05.2011
I Confederation of Danish Industries
(Transportation Department)
Director 23.05.2011
J DG Transport, Unit E5 Aviation
Security
Policy Officer 06.05.2011/
17.05.2011
K Ministry of Climate and Energy of
Denmark (Danish Energy Agency)
Civil Engineer,
Department of Energy
Supply
26.05.2011
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